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ABSTRACT

In an increasingly mobile world, the combination of mobile computing devices,
publicly accessible Wi-Fi hotspots, and camera phones pose a significant threat to
alphanumeric passwords in public environments. Graphical passwords, introduced as
an alternative to alphanumerical passwords, help prevent successful shoulder-surfing
attacks – covertly observing or recording a password login session, however, most
cannot prevent intersection analysis on the data collected through shoulder-surfing.
ColorDots is a new graphical password scheme designed to be easy to use and learn, to
prevent successful shoulder-surfing attacks, and to hinder intersection analysis. A
software implementation of ColorDots is tested, and the results analyzed. This study
showed the ColorDots graphical password scheme does prevent shoulder-surfing, and
hinders intersection analysis on digital recordings of multiple shoulder-surfing attacks.
Furthermore, ColorDots may be just as convenient to use as alphanumeric passwords,
while improving password security in public environments.

x

Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

Computer passwords control access to computer systems and digital information. As
computing systems have become more accessible, stronger and more complex password
schemes have been required to prevent unauthorized access and to protect information.
The preponderance of mobile computing devices, publicly accessible Wi-Fi hotspots,
and camera phones (mobile phones with built-in, high-quality cameras) pose a
significant threat to the continued use of alphanumeric passwords for the purpose of
user authentication in public environments.

Graphical password schemes are an alternative to traditional alphanumeric passwords.
Graphical passwords offer several advantages over alphanumeric passwords; however,
many of the proposed schemes are susceptible to shoulder-surfing. A form of social
engineering, shoulder-surfing occurs when an attacker observes or records a user
entering their password to gain access to a computer system. A number of shouldersurfing-resistant graphical password schemes have been proposed, but they offer little
defense against intersection analysis. Intersection analysis is a method used to analyze
the changes observed between multiple login attempts to help determine a user’s
password (Dumphy10). A successful graphical password scheme must prevent
successful shoulder-surfing attacks and resist intersection analysis; however, it must
also be easy to learn and use. A review of the literature failed to produce a single
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graphical password scheme that significantly met these requirements. ColorDots is a
new graphical password scheme based on the effective elements of three successful
graphical password schemes. The purpose of this study is to determine whether
ColorDots satisfies each of the requirements for a successful graphical password
scheme. A software implementation of ColorDots allows subjects to interact with the
graphical password scheme during multiple phases of testing, and the results analyzed.
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Chapter 2
GRAPHICAL PASSWORDS

Greg Blonder was the first to propose graphical passwords as an alternative to
alphanumeric passwords (Blonder96). Graphical password schemes are a solution to
many of the human-induced vulnerabilities of alphanumeric passwords such as selecting
simple or common words for passwords, writing passwords down, and using personal
information within passwords. The concept that human beings are capable of recalling
graphical information more easily than alphanumeric information is the basis for
graphical passwords. Moncur et al. describes three general graphical password systems
(Moncur07). Drawmetric schemes, Figure 1-A, require users to redraw a predefined
picture. Cognometric schemes, Figure 1-B, require users to select a set of predefined
target images from a larger set of distraction images. Locimetric schemes, Figure 1-C,
require users to click predefined points on a given image.

A major drawback of the Drawmetric and Locimetric schemes is that user input is timeinvariant – does not change from login to login (Man03). Although early Cognometric
schemes also suffered from time-invariant input, later proposals took steps to overcome
this vulnerability. The primary disadvantage of time-invariant password schemes,
alphanumeric or graphical, is their susceptibility to shoulder-surfing attacks – an
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attacker need only view a successful authentication attempt once to compromise a
user’s account (Tari06).
Draw-a-Secret (1999)

PassFaces (2000)

PassPoints (2005)

A) Drawmetric

B) Cognometric

C) Locimetric

Figure 1: Graphical Password Schemes

2.1 Shoulder-surfing

Shoulder-surfing is most likely to occur in public environments such as a coffee shop,
café or library where users are less likely to be suspicious of others sitting or standing
nearby (Gao09). Attackers often use devices such as a camera phone to record the
password entry process to reduce their risk of discovery. This has the potential of
allowing attackers to collect passwords over an extended period. Such techniques have
been successful against Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs) to allow attackers to make
fraudulent withdrawals (De Luca10). As camera phones become more prevalent in
society, shoulder-surfing attacks are likely to become more common and successful
(Tari06). For this reason, researchers have proposed several graphical password
schemes that resist shoulder-surfing attacks.
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2.2 Shoulder-surfing Resistant Graphical Password Schemes

Graphical password schemes resistant to shoulder-surfing attacks appear in two general
categories: multi-factor schemes and indirect input schemes (Lashkari09). Multi-factor
schemes involve the use of multiple inputs or technologies such as a smart card, key
generator dongle, voice recognition or optical scanner. Even if an attacker acquires the
user’s graphical password, they are unable to log into the system without the additional
authentication factor(s). Indirect input schemes involve surreptitious input methods to
avoid direct identification of the password such as using a keyboard, clicking within an
on-screen region containing the graphical password images or tracking the user’s eye
movements. Due to the scope of this paper, the review of graphical password schemes
is limited to indirect input schemes involving the use of a keyboard and/or mouse.

Sorbrado et al. proposed several graphical password schemes resistant to shouldersurfing attacks (Sobrado02). The Intersection scheme, Figure 2, requires the user to
locate their password images and click within the region containing the intersection
point of the imaginary lines connecting each pair of images (the lines and circles in
Figure 2 are for illustration purposes only and are not visible to the user). To prevent
guessing, users are required to complete this process multiple times using different
image layouts to log into the system.
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Figure 2: Intersection Scheme

The Triangle scheme, proposed by Sobrado and Birget (Sobrado02), influenced the
Convex Hull Click (CHC) scheme proposed by Wiedenbeck et al., Figure 3
(Wiedenbeck06). The CHC scheme requires users to locate their password images and
then click within the convex hull region created by the images. Like the Intersection
scheme, users must complete this process multiple times in order to log into the system.

ColorPIN, Figure 4, the indirect input scheme proposed by De Luca et al., uses a
keyboard for password entry rather than a mouse because the scheme is intended for use
with ATMs. With this scheme, users locate each number in their Personal Identification
Number (PIN) and select the appropriate letter corresponding to the number’s position
in the PIN – black, red, white or black for positions 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively.
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Figure 3: Convex Hull Click (CHC) Scheme

Figure 4: ColorPIN Scheme
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Due to the shoulder-surfing resistant design of the reviewed graphical password
schemes, even if an attacker records the user entering their password, the attacker is
unable to identify the user’s password images – preventing the attacker from logging
into the system. However, if an attacker is able to record the user entering their
password multiple times, the attacker is more likely to discover the user’s password by
performing intersection analysis on the recordings.

2.3 Intersection Analysis

Intersection analysis is useful for identifying users’ passwords in time-variant graphical
password schemes such as Intersection, CHC, and ColorPIN, where the input required
to log into the system changes with each login session. Intersection analysis is more
effective when performed on data contained in shoulder-surfing recordings allowing for
repeated analysis of the recorded data. Studies have shown that intersection analysis
performed on as few as two recordings can successfully identify a user’s password (De
Luca10).

One characteristic of graphical password schemes, which make them more susceptible
to intersection analysis, is the ratio of the number of displayed distraction images and
the total number of distraction images. A particular distraction image may appear in the
interface at a lower frequency than the target images, if this ratio is low (Dumphy10).
By comparing the frequency at which the images appear in the interface, an attacker
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may identify the user’s password images. To prevent this form of intersection analysis,
researchers suggest using the same set of images for each login session.

A review of the available literature produced a number of graphical password schemes
resistant to shoulder-surfing attacks, but all were susceptible to intersection analysis.
Although two of these schemes claimed to be resistant to intersection analysis involving
video recordings of a user’s password entries, the authors failed to support their claims
by considering only two such recordings or by ignoring analysis of video recordings
altogether (Gao09 and Shi09).

-9-

Chapter 3
COLORDOTS

ColorDots, a new graphical password scheme, implements effective elements of the
Intersection, Convex Hull Click (CHC), and ColorPIN graphical password schemes in
an attempt to produce a graphical password scheme that not only resists shouldersurfing attack, but also hinders intersection analysis.

Users must complete a registration process prior to using the ColorDots graphical
password scheme. During the registration process, users will enter their personal data
such as their name and email address. Additionally, users will create a username and
graphical password, which involves choosing three images from the set of available
images. Users can authenticate using the graphical password scheme once they
complete the registration process.

The proposed graphical password interface, Figure 5, consists of the image grid,
registration dots for each row and column, and a set of user controls. The image grid
contains 5x5 cells where each cell consists of a border color, a password image, and
five uniquely colored alphanumeric characters – each selected randomly from its
respective set. The user controls include the Enter Password field and buttons to
refresh the grid or request help.
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To defend against shoulder-surfing attack, the interface prevents the mouse pointer from
entering the image grid section during the authentication process. To defend against
intersection analysis, after each keystroke, the interface refreshes the ColorDots grid –
the system randomly shuffles all of the colors, as well as creates a new set of
alphanumeric characters for each cell, however, the images are unaffected.

Figure 5: ColorDots Interface (FatCow11)

To log in using the ColorDots graphical password scheme, the following procedure is
performed (refer to Figure 6).
1. Locate the three password images in the ColorDots grid (Figure 6-A).
2. Visualize a triangle over the ColorDots grid that connects the three password
images (Figure 6-B).
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3. Visually draw horizontal, vertical and diagonal lines from the center of each of
the three password images towards the interior of the triangle (Figure 6-B).
4. Continue to extend the lines until one line from each password image intersects
over one of the image cells within the triangle – the Initial Intersection Cell (C0)
(Figure 6-C).
5. Identify the Row Registration Dot (RRD) that has the same color as the border
of Cn1 (Figure 6-D).
6. Identify the Column Registration Dot (CRD) that has the same color as the RRD
of Cn (Figure 6-D).
7. Locate the cell that exists at the intersection of the RRD and CRD identified in
steps 5 and 6, respectively – the First Password Cell (Cn+12) (Figure 6-D).
8. Identify the letter from Cn+1 that has the same color as the CRD of Cn, and enter
the letter in the password field (Figure 6-E).
9. Repeat steps 5 through 8 to locate the four remaining password cells (C2 through
C5) starting from the last password cell identified (Cn+1).

After entering all five letters in the password field, the interface automatically submits
the password for authentication. Clicking the Refresh button during the authentication
process refreshes the image grid, and the authentication process restarts from the
beginning. Clicking the Help button during the authentication process hides the image
grid and displays the help screen – the image grid becomes visible again only after the
help screen is closed.
1
2

Possible values Cn are C0 through C4
Possible values of Cn+1 are C1 through C5
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A

B

D

C

E

Figure 6: The ColorDots Process (FatCow11)

To prevent brute force attacks, users have a maximum of three attempts to log into the
system. After each failed attempt, the interface automatically refreshes the image grid
to prevent an attacker from isolating a series of image combinations. If a user fails to
authenticate within three attempts, the system locks their account and sends an email
message detailing the excessive attempts to their configured email address. The
message directs the user to unlock their account using an enclosed link. After
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unlocking their account, the system cautions the user to create a new graphical
password images.

The proposed graphical password scheme eliminates shoulder-surfing attacks involving
a casual observer through several key features. The user cannot move the mouse
pointer over the image grid section preventing them from accidentally identifying their
graphical password. The randomly selected alphanumeric characters making up the
password occur throughout the interface and can appear multiple times, even in the
same cell. The user enters the alphanumeric characters of the password in the password
field using the keyboard, preventing simultaneous observation of the keyboard and
interface. Finally, refreshing the ColorDots grid after every keystroke produces too
much information for the casual observer to process.

The proposed graphical password scheme eliminates shoulder-surfing attacks involving
a single recorded session using a recording device such as a camera phone. Due to the
time-variant nature of the proposed scheme, the recording of a single login session is
insufficient to reduce the set of password image candidates to a manageable number,
which has been determined to be seven images (a 3-in-35 or 8.57% chance of selecting
the correct password images).

The proposed graphical password scheme resists shoulder-surfing attacks involving
multiple recorded sessions using a recording device such as a camera phone. The
random nature of the ColorDots grid, including refreshing the grid after every
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keystroke, hinders the use of intersection analysis to reduce the set of password image
candidates to a manageable number. Although the potential exists that the analysis of
each recorded session will reveal a unique set of distraction images, an estimated
minimum of five such recorded sessions must exist to produce a set of seven password
image candidates.
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Chapter 4
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

The objective of the current study is to determine whether the ColorDots graphical
password scheme is easy to learn, easy to use, prevents single-session shoulder-surfing
attacks, and resists the intersection analysis of multiple recordings of shoulder-surfing
attacks.

The evaluation of the ColorDots graphical password scheme uses a factorial design
based on repeated measurements of participant performance. The independent variables
are the password type (random or user-generated) and password method (alphanumeric
or graphical). The alphanumeric password entries serve as the control condition.
Participants perform four authentications – one authentication for each combination of
the independent variables.

The current study occurs in three independent phases. The first phase tests the ability of
participants to authenticate using ColorDots. The second phase tests the ability of
participants to recall their graphical password one week after their initial exposure to
the graphical password scheme. The third phase tests the ability of participants to
identify a ColorDots graphical password using intersection analysis techniques on
multiple recordings of simulated shoulder-surfing attack on a victim authenticating with
ColorDots. Afterwards, participants complete a survey regarding the characteristics of
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the ColorDots graphical password scheme, including its ease of use and its perceived
vulnerability to shoulder-surfing attack.

4.1 Phase 1: ColorDots Familiarization and Initial Tests

After an introduction to the ColorDots graphical password scheme, participants
complete the registration process, practice using the ColorDots password scheme, and
perform four tests involving alphanumeric and graphical passwords. During the
registration process, participants enter their demographic data and create an
alphanumeric and graphical password (the user-generated passwords), which are used
throughout the study. Next, participants review instructions on authenticating with the
ColorDots password scheme and practice authenticating until they successfully log in
three times, assuring they are sufficiently prepared to complete the initial tests.
Throughout the practice period, participants have access to the ColorDots instructions.

During initial testing, participants demonstrate their ability to authenticate using random
and user-generated alphanumeric and graphical passwords. For each test, participants
have three attempts to authenticate successfully with the given password type and
method. If successful, the system records the password type and method, the number of
attempts, the elapsed time of the successful attempt, and the total elapsed time,
however, the system records only the password type and method if the participant is
unable to authenticate within the allotted attempts.
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4.2 Phase 2: Recall Tests

One week after completing the phase one tests, participants perform two recall tests
involving the user-generated alphanumeric and graphical passwords. Participants
perform the recall tests in the same manner as the initial tests, including the recording of
the data. Participants whom fail to authenticate using their graphical password have an
opportunity to review and practice the ColorDots authentication process using a random
graphical password until they successfully log in one time. With their remediation
completed, participants have another opportunity to authenticate using their graphical
password. This second opportunity helps distinguish the participants who are unable to
recall the ColorDots authentication process from those who are unable to recall their
graphical password.

4.3 Phase 3: Shoulder-surfing Attack Test

Upon completion of the phase one tests, participants receive a collection of 10
screenshots of a simulated shoulder-surfing attack against a user authenticating with the
ColorDots password scheme. Participants perform intersection analysis techniques on
the collection of screenshots during the one-week period between Phases 1 and 2 in an
attempt to identify the victim’s graphical password. Participants receive an example of
an intersection analysis algorithm to use; however, they are free to use any process they
choose. Participants are free to analyze as many screenshots as necessary to reduce the
number of candidate graphical password images to seven or less.
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To prepare for the simulated shoulder-surfing attacks, modifications to the ColorDots
graphical password scheme compensated for the inability of the screenshots to capture
the level of detail possible with a recording device such as a camera phone. Although
the ColorDots password scheme leverages indirect input to prevent shoulder-surfing
attacks, the screenshots display only the ColorDots interface. Furthermore, the
screenshots clearly display the alphanumeric password characters entered in the Enter
Password field, which normally masks the characters. Finally, by disabling the feature
responsible for randomly updating the ColorDots interface after entering each
alphanumeric password character, each screenshot represents a complete graphical
password login session. Ultimately, these modifications limit the overall complexity of
the ColorDots graphical password scheme, allowing participants to focus on identifying
the victim’s graphical password rather than analyzing the ColorDots graphical password
scheme.

To complete the test, participants select three graphical password images that, based on
their analysis, represent the victim’s graphical password. The system records the
password images selected and whether the participant identified the victim’s graphical
password. To eliminate instances of guessing, participants who correctly identified the
victim’s graphical password must demonstrate the intersection analysis technique used.

- 19 -

Chapter 5
DATA COLLECTION

5.1 Subjects

The participants for the study are volunteers from a population consisting of University
of North Florida (UNF) students, 18 years of age or older, enrolled in at least one course
offered through the School of Computing. All volunteers are eligible regardless of
gender, race or other demographic variables. The selecting of participants is in
accordance with the Institutional Review Board (IRB), which is responsible for
reviewing and approving all human subject studies performed at the University of North
Florida. The IRB reviewed and approved the ColorDots study application as ExemptCategory 2 (IRB# 10-111).

5.2 Demographics

The collected demographic data includes each participant’s age, gender, visual acuity,
colorblindness, handedness, computer experience, and education level. A participant’s
age, gender or handedness may reduce his or her ability to learn and/or use the
ColorDots graphical password scheme. Furthermore, due to its visual components,
participants with less than optimal eyesight or colorblindness may be unable to
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distinguish between the alphanumeric characters or perceive one or more of the colors
present in the ColorDots interface. Finally, a participant’s computer experience or
education level may improve his or her ability to learn and/or use the ColorDots
graphical password scheme.

5.3 Procedure

The study takes place over a two-week period. Participants complete Phase 1 during
the first week and Phases 2 and 3 one week later. All volunteers may participate during
the first week; however, only those participants who completed Phase 1 may complete
Phases 2 and 3. The student identification scheme used at UNF (the “N” number)
uniquely tracks each participant throughout the study. Upon completion of each phase,
data collected on the participant’s performance is stored in two locations – the
ColorDots database and a participant-specific XML data file – to prevent data loss in
the event of a system failure.

5.4 Apparatus

For the purpose of the study, the ColorDots graphical password scheme is implemented
as a Windows application, using the Microsoft® Visual Studio® 2010 development
software with the Visual C#® programming language and the .Net 3.5 Framework®, and
Microsoft® SQL Server® 2008. The hardware for the study consists of 15 desktop
computers running the Microsoft® Windows 7 ® operating system with the .Net 3.5
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Framework®, and the database server running the Microsoft® Windows Server® 2008
operating system. The University of North Florida’s School of Computing provided all
of the computer hardware for this study.

The source code for the ColorDots application, the database design schema, the
collected data, and all other documentation for this study is available on the
accompanying compact disc.
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Chapter 6
RESULTS OF DATA ANALYSIS

The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software package, provided by
the University of North Florida, was used to analyze the data collected during this
study.

6.1 Demographics

Although 59 subjects participated in the study, analysis of the collected data did not
occur for 20 participants. Of the participants not included in the analysis, 13 did not
attend the second week of the study, four completed only one of the three training tests
due to a software configuration error, and three had to evacuate the testing area due to a
fire alarm in Building 15. This study used only the collected data of 39 participants.

Table 1 lists the collected participant demographics. All but two of the 18 participants,
whose corrected visual acuity was 20/20, wore their corrective lenses throughout the
study. All the participants used their mouse hand – the hand normally used to control
the mouse.
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Demographic

Female

Male

7

32

Gender (G)

Minimum
Age (A)
Computer Experience (CE)
Education Level (EL)

Visual Acuity (VA)
Corrective Lenses (CL)

Writing Handedness (WH)
Mouse Handedness (MH)

Average

Maximum

25
11
16

64
44
19

18
3
14
<= 20/20

Corr. to 20/20

> 20/20

Not Sure

14
0

18
18

3
0

4
0

Left

Right

5
1

34
38

Table 1: Demographic Data

6.2 Correlations

Analysis performed on select demographic data and survey questions sought whether
correlations existed between, or within, the analyzed data. Table 2 lists the results of
this analysis. Each of the eight survey questions was in one of two categories.
Questions 0, 3, 4, 5 and 7 referred to whether ColorDots was easy to learn and use.
Questions 1, 2 and 6 referred to the perceived vulnerability of alphanumeric and
graphical passwords to shoulder-surfing attacks. The survey questions are included in
Appendix B of this paper.
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Several significant correlations existed between the analyzed data.


Gender and Question 6 (Q6) (sig. 0.045)



Age and Education Level (sig. 0.006)



Age and Computer Experience (sig. 0.000)



Question 0 (Q0) and Question 3 (Q3) (sig. 0.011)



Question 0 and Question 5 (Q5) (sig. 0.026)



Question 2 (Q2) and Question 3 (sig. 0.009)



Question 2 and Question 4 (Q4) (sig. 0.022)



Question 2 and Question 6 (sig. 0.033)



Question 3 and Question 4 (sig. 0.000)



Question 3 and Question 5 (sig. 0.019)



Question 4 and Question 5 (sig. 0.004)



Question 4 and Question 7 (Q7) (sig. 0.035)

G
A
EL
CE
Q0
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
Q6

A

EL

CE

Q0

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5

Q6

Q7

.735

.261
.006

.826
.000
.070

.704
.416
.368
.172

.056
.494
.747
.223
.742

.797
.545
.086
.817
.377
.728

.447
.663
.827
.799
.011
.315
.009

.470
.964
.472
.753
.085
.510
.022
.000

.289
.739
.709
.361
.026
.720
.582
.019
.004

.045
.444
.128
.498
.856
.456
.033
.585
.755
.260

.737
.188
.738
.218
.050
.897
.937
.075
.035
.112
.395

Table 2: Demographic and Survey Question Correlations
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6.3 Initial Tests

The initial tests measured the ability of participants to log into alphanumeric and
graphical interfaces with random and user-generated passwords. The subsections below
present the results of the initial tests. Throughout this section, the data analyzed
represent successful attempts only.

The two-way repeated measures analysis of variation (ANOVA) performed on the
collected data sought to discover significant differences between the alphanumeric and
graphical interfaces, the random and user-generated passwords, and the interaction
between the interfaces and passwords. The analyzed data defined two sections of
results. The first section reported password input accuracy, which represented the pass
rate – the number of participants who successfully logged in, and the attempt and
interface refresh counts required to enter the password successfully. Higher pass rates,
and lower attempt and refresh counts, equated to greater accuracy. The second section
reported password completion time, which represented the time required to log in
during the successful attempt and the total time required to log in, which includes the
successful attempt and each, if any, of the failed attempts. Throughout the analysis, the
differential main effect - the difference of effects of each of the independent variables
on the dependent variables - was calculated, and a probability of less than 0.05 was used
to determine whether the difference was statistically significant, and not simply due to
chance.
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6.3.1 Accuracy

Table 3 lists the pass rate, the average attempt count and the average refresh count when
logging into the graphical interface. The alphanumeric interface with the usergenerated password had the highest pass rate (100%), and the graphical interface with
the random password had the lowest pass rate (82.05%). The alphanumeric interface
with the user-generated password had the lowest attempt count (1.05), but the
alphanumeric interface with the random password and the graphical interface with the
user-generated password had 1.08 average attempts. The graphical interface with the
random password had the lowest refresh count (0.03); however, the alphanumeric
interface did not support the refresh functionality.

Interface

Pass Rate (%)

Alphanumeric Random
Alphanumeric User Gen.
Graphical Random
Graphical User Gen.

94.87
100.00
82.05
84.62

Average
Attempt
Count

Average
Refresh
Count

1.08
1.05
1.13
1.08

N/A
N/A
0.03
0.23

Table 3: Accuracy Components by Interface (Initial Tests)

6.3.1.1 Pass Rate

One of the most important considerations of a password scheme was whether users
were likely to log in successfully and consistently. Since the analyzed data only
represented successful attempts for both interfaces, no significant difference existed
between the interface or password aspects with respect to pass rate.
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6.3.1.2 Attempt Count

Another important consideration for a password scheme was the number of attempts
users needed to log in successfully. Table 4 lists the ANOVA results for the analyzed
attempt count data.

Source
Interface
Password
Inf/Pwd

Value

F

Sig.

.157
.030
.006

3.459
.657
.137

.076
.426
.714

Table 4: Analysis of Variance: Attempt Count (Initial Tests)

No significance existed for the interface or password aspects of the attempt count data.

6.3.1.3 Refresh Count

If a password scheme was too complex or confusing, users might need to refresh the
interface multiple times to log in successfully. Table 5 lists the ANOVA results for the
analyzed refresh count data. The alphanumeric interface did not support the refresh
functionality.
Source
Interface
Password
Inf/Pwd

Value

F

Sig.

N/A
.131
.131

N/A
2.885
2.885

N/A
.103
.103

Table 5: Analysis of Variance: Refresh Count (Initial Tests)
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No significance existed for the interface or password aspects of the refresh count data.

6.3.2 Completion Time

Table 6 lists the average attempt and login times recorded for the initial tests. The
alphanumeric interface with the user-generated password had the lowest average
attempt and login times (3.65 and 3.80 seconds, respectively), and the graphical
interface with the user-generated password had the lowest average attempt and login
times for the graphical interface (57.95 and 82.67 seconds, respectively).

Interface

Average
Attempt Time
(sec)

Average
Login Time
(sec)

Alphanumeric Random
Alphanumeric User Gen.
Graphical Random
Graphical User Gen.

5.99
3.65
69.83
57.95

7.01
3.80
92.35
82.67

Table 6: Completion Time Components by Interface (Initial Tests)

Although analyzed data considers the interface and password combinations separately,
it is important to analyze the interaction between the two variables. The performed
ANOVA evaluated the interactions between interfaces and password types with respect
to the attempt and login time.
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6.3.2.1 Attempt Time

How long it took users to complete a single attempt is important in determining whether
users will choose to use a given password scheme. Table 7 lists the ANOVA results for
the analyzed attempt time data.
Source

Value

F

Sig.

Interface
Password
Inf/Pwd

3.013
.117
.089

66.287
2.572
1.953

.000
.123
.176

Table 7: Analysis of Variance: Attempt Time (Initial Tests)

A significant differential main effect existed for the interface aspect (sig. 0.000), but no
significance existed for the password or interaction aspects of the attempt time data.

6.3.2.2 Login Time

The total time required to log in determines whether users will likely choose to use a
given password scheme. Table 8 lists the ANOVA results for the analyzed.
Source
Interface
Password
Inf/Pwd

Value

F

Sig.

.942
.053
.036

20.718
1.168
.800

.000
.292
.381

Table 8: Analysis of Variance: Login Time (Initial Tests)
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A significant differential main effect existed for the interface aspect (sig. 0.000), but no
significance existed for the password or interaction aspects of the login time data.

6.4 Recall Tests

The recall tests measured participants’ ability to log into the alphanumeric and graphical
interfaces, using the passwords created during initial testing, after one week of disuse.
The subsections below present the results of the recall tests. Throughout this section,
the data analyzed represent successful logins only.

The one-way repeated measures ANOVA performed on the collected data sought to
discover significant differences between the alphanumeric and graphical interfaces.
The analyzed data defined two sections of results. The first section reported password
input accuracy, which represented the pass rate, and the attempt and interface refresh
counts required to enter the password successfully. The second section reported
password completion time. Throughout the analysis, the differential main effect - the
difference of effects of each of the independent variables on the dependent variables was calculated, and a probability of less than 0.05 was used to determine whether the
difference was statistically significant, and not simply due to chance.
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6.4.1 Accuracy

Table 9 lists the pass rate, the average attempt count and the average refresh count when
logging into the graphical interface. Both interfaces achieved a pass rate of 94.87%.
The alphanumeric interface had the lowest attempt count (1.05). The graphical
interface with the user-generated password had the lowest refresh count (0.18);
however, the alphanumeric interface did not support the refresh functionality.

Interface

Pass Rate (%)

Average
Attempt
Count

Average
Refresh
Count

Alphanumeric User Gen.
Graphical User Gen.

94.87
94.87

1.05
1.41

N/A
0.18

Table 9: Accuracy Components by Interface (Recall Tests)

The analyzed data did not consider the password type or the interaction between the two
variables since the interfaces used the user-generated passwords only. The performed
ANOVA evaluated the differences between the two interfaces using the user-generated
password with respect to the pass rate, and attempt and refresh counts.

6.4.1.1 Pass Rate

One of the most important considerations of a password scheme was whether users
were likely to log in successfully and consistently, after a period of disuse. Since the
analyzed data only represented successful logins for both interfaces, no significant
difference existed between the interface or password aspects with respect to pass rate.
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6.4.1.2 Attempt Count

Another important consideration for a password scheme was the number of attempts
users needed to log in successfully. Table 10 lists the ANOVA results for the analyzed
attempt count data.
Source

Value

Interface

F

.448

9.859

Sig.
.005

Table 10: Analysis of Variance: Attempt Count (Recall Tests)

A significant differential main effect existed for the interface aspect (sig. 0.005) of the
attempt count data.

6.4.1.3 Refresh Count

If a password scheme was too complex, or confusing, users might need to refresh the
interface multiple times to log in successfully. The analyzed data did not consider the
refresh count results since the alphanumeric interface did not support the refresh
functionality.

6.4.2 Completion Time

Table 11 lists the average attempt and login times recorded for the recall tests. The
alphanumeric interface had the lowest average attempt and login times (5.97 and 6.59
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seconds, respectively), and the graphical interface had an average attempt and login
times of 98.71 and 154.12 seconds, respectively.

Interface

Attempt Time
(sec)

Login Time
(sec)

Alphanumeric User Gen.
Graphical User Gen.

5.97
98.71

6.59
154.12

Table 11: Completion Time Components by Interface (Recall Tests)

The analyzed data did not consider the password type or the interaction between the two
variables since the interfaces used the user-generated passwords only. The performed
ANOVA evaluated the differences between the two interfaces using the user-generated
password with respect to the attempt and login times.

6.4.2.1 Attempt Time

How long it took users to complete a single login attempt is important in determining
whether users will choose to use a given password scheme. Table 12 lists the ANOVA
results for the analyzed attempt time data.
Source
Interface

Value

F

Sig.

3.340

73.484

.000

Table 12: Analysis of Variance: Attempt Time (Recall Tests)

A significant differential main effect existed for the interface aspect (sig. 0.000) of the
attempt time data.
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6.4.2.2 Login Time

The total time required to log in determines whether users will likely choose to use a
given password scheme. Table 13 lists the ANOVA results for the analyzed login time
data.
Source

Value

F

Sig.

Interface

1.269

27.919

.000

Table 13: Analysis of Variance: Login Time (Recall Tests)

A significant differential main effect existed for the interface aspect (sig. 0.000) of the
login time data.

6.5 ColorDots Training and Test Results Comparison

The data collected and analyzed, representing the three training sessions, and the initial
and recall tests, determined whether the ColorDots graphical password scheme was easy
to learn. Table 14 lists the average values of this data. A common pattern existed
within the presented results. The initial test value was lower than the three training
values, and the recall test value, while lower than the three training values, was higher
than the initial test value. The only exception to this pattern occurred within the refresh
count results where the recall test value was lower than the initial test value.

- 35 -

Source
Training 1
Training 2
Training 3
Initial
Recall

Average
Attempt
Count

Average
Attempt
Time (sec)

Average
Login
Time (sec)

Average
Refresh
Count

2.57
1.83
1.87
1.26
1.57

284.79
119.62
86.58
66.82
104.63

632.09
858.47
1019.05
100.867
179.08

4.00
4.44
4.44
0.39
0.30

Table 14: Graphical User-generated Password Results

Tables 15 and 16 list the ANOVA results for the initial and recall data, respectively.

Source
Training 1
Training 2
Training 3

Average
Attempt
Count

Average
Attempt
Time (sec)

Average
Login
Time (sec)

Average
Refresh
Count

.011
.039
.023

.000
.034
.053

.000
.000
.000

.059
.038
.034

Table 15: Graphical User-generated Password Analysis (Initial Tests)

Source
Training 1
Training 2
Training 3

Average
Attempt
Count

Average
Attempt
Time (sec)

Average
Login
Time (sec)

Average
Refresh
Count

.063
.208
.245

.001
.442
.129

.000
.000
.000

.067
.044
.041

Table 16: Graphical User-generated Password Analysis (Recall Tests)

A significant differential main effect existed for each of the comparisons between the
trainings and the initial tests, except for the refresh count and attempt time for Training
Sessions 1 and 3, respectively. A significant differential main effect existed for none of
the comparisons between the trainings and the recall tests except for Training Session
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1’s attempt time, the login times for each of the training sessions, and the refresh counts
for Training Sessions 2 and 3.

6.6 Shoulder-surfing Test

An easily compromised password scheme is useless regardless of whether it is easy to
learn and use. The shoulder-surfing test sought to determine whether the ColorDots
graphical password could be compromised using intersection analysis. Table 17 lists
the results of the shoulder-surfing test. Of the 39 participants, only 3 (7.70%)
successfully identified the graphical password images used.
Passed

Failed

Success Rate (%)

3

36

7.70

Table 17: Shoulder-surfing Test Outcome

The performed one-way repeated measure ANOVA compared the collected shouldersurfing test to a set of all-pass values. Table 18 lists the ANOVA results for the
analyzed shoulder-surfing data.
Source

Value

F

Sig.

STP

12.000

456.000

.000

Table 18: Analysis of Variance: Shoulder-surfing Test

A significant differential main effect existed for the shoulder-surfing data (sig. 0.000).
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Chapter 7
DISCUSSION

Graphical password research began in the mid 1990’s as an alternative to traditional
alphanumeric passwords, not only to provide a mechanism for improved password
recall, but also to prevent shoulder-surfing attacks. Researchers continued to study new
ways to improve graphical password security; however, while many graphical password
schemes were resistant to shoulder-surfing attacks involving direct observation or
single-session recordings, most remained vulnerable to intersection analysis performed
on multiple recordings. The current study presented a newly proposed graphical
password scheme capable of preventing shoulder-surfing attacks, as well as resisting
attempts to compromise a graphical password using intersection analysis. The findings
suggested that the proposed graphical password scheme would be easy to learn and to
use while preventing shoulder-surfing attacks and resisting intersection analysis.

7.1 Implications of Data Analysis

In reference to graphical passwords, a balance must exist between security and ease-ofuse – attaining a greater level of security through a modest increase in password
complexity. One of the primary questions answered in this study was whether users,
accustomed to using alphanumeric passwords, would be willing to accept the additional
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complexity inherent in a graphical password, in exchange for improved password
security.

7.1.1 Accuracy

The first aspect of accuracy considered in the evaluation of the ColorDots graphical
password scheme was whether users were as likely to log in successfully using a
graphical password compared to an alphanumeric password, referred to as the pass rate.
The analyzed pass rate data indicated a significant difference existed between the
graphical and alphanumeric interfaces with respect to successful login attempts. The
mean percentage of successful login attempts was 90.39% for all subjects, and the mean
percentage of successful login attempts for the alphanumeric and graphical interfaces
using user-generated passwords was 100% and 84.62%, respectively. These results are
indicative of the relative experience subjects had with each interface. For the recall
tests, the mean percentage of successful login attempts for both interfaces using usergenerated passwords was 94.87% for all subjects. This outcome – a decreased pass rate
for the alphanumeric interface and an increased pass rate for the graphical interface –
supports previous research suggesting graphical passwords are easier to remember than
alphanumeric passwords (Sobrado02). The results suggested users were as likely to
recall their graphical password as their alphanumeric password; therefore, they are
equally likely to log in successfully using either password type.
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The second aspect of accuracy considered in the evaluation of the ColorDots graphical
password scheme was whether users required a greater number of attempts to log in
successfully using the graphical password compared to the alphanumeric password.
The results indicated no significant difference existed in the number of attempts
required to log into either interface. The mean percentage of correctness – the number
of subjects who logged in with a single attempt compared to all the subjects – was
92.17%, and the mean percentage of correctness for the alphanumeric and graphical
interfaces using user-generated passwords was 95.24% and 92.59%, respectively.
These values are higher than, but consistent with, previous research (Wiedenbeck06).
The recall tests indicated a significant difference existed between the alphanumeric and
graphical interfaces with respect to attempt count. The mean percentage of correctness
for all subjects, as well as the graphical interface using user-generated passwords, fell to
81.30% and 70.92%, respectively, while the alphanumeric interface using usergenerated passwords remained unaffected. This disparity is likely due to subjects
having more experience with alphanumeric passwords than graphical passwords.

The third aspect of accuracy considered in the evaluation of the ColorDots graphical
password scheme was whether users required a greater number of refreshes to
successfully log into the graphical interface. The results indicated no significant
difference existed in the number of refreshes required to log into the graphical interface
regardless of password familiarity. The mean percentage of refreshes – the total
number of interface refreshes made compared to the total number of login attempts – for
all subjects was 13.82%, and the mean percentage of refreshes for the random and user-
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generated graphical passwords was 2.56% and 23.08%, respectively. The number of
subjects that performed a refresh on the random and user-generated graphical interface
was one and four, respectfully. The refresh count results for the recall tests, which
involved only the user-generated graphical password, showed an improvement with a
mean percentage of refreshes of 17.95%, and only two subjects performed a refresh.
The results agreed with those published in previous research (De Luca10). The results
indicated that the complexity of the graphical interface, and not the graphical password,
was the primary factor affecting successful logins.

7.1.2 Completion Time

The first aspect of completion time considered in the evaluation of the ColorDots
graphical password scheme was whether the attempt time – the time required to
complete a successful login attempt – was likely to increase using a graphical password
compared to a alphanumeric password. An analysis of the attempt times indicated a
significant difference existed between the graphical and alphanumeric interfaces
regarding attempt time. The mean attempt time for the alphanumeric and graphical
interfaces using user-generated passwords was 3.65 seconds and 57.95 seconds,
respectively. Due to the simplicity of alphanumeric passwords, these results were not
surprising. For the recall tests, the mean attempt time was 5.97 seconds for the
alphanumeric interface and 98.71 seconds for the graphical interface using usergenerated passwords, which was an increase over initial test results of 63.56% and
70.34%, respectively. Again, these results were not surprising considering users had to
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recall not only their graphical password, but how to log into the graphical interface, as
well. Furthermore, the relative increase in attempt time during the recall tests for the
interfaces was consistent – the graphical interface attempt time increased 10.67% more
than the alphanumeric interface. This increase in the graphical interface attempt time
compared to the alphanumeric interface is supported by previous research; furthermore,
the results presented by Wiedenbeck, et al, were consistent with the results presented
here (Wiedenbeck06).

The second aspect of completion time considered in the evaluation of the ColorDots
graphical password scheme was whether the login time – the total time required to
complete the login process, including the successful attempt and each, if any, of the
failed log in attempts – was likely to increase using graphical passwords compared to
alphanumeric passwords. An analysis of the login times indicated a significant
difference existed between the graphical and alphanumeric interfaces with respect to
login time. The mean login time for the alphanumeric and graphical interfaces using
user-generated passwords was 3.80 seconds and 82.67 seconds, respectively. For the
recall tests, the mean login time was 6.59 seconds for the alphanumeric interface and
154.12 seconds for the graphical interface using user-generated passwords, which was
an increase of 73.42% and 86.43%, respectively, over initial test results. The relative
increase in login time during the recall tests for the alphanumeric and graphical
interfaces was less consistent than the attempt time results – the graphical interface’s
login time increased 17.72% more than the alphanumeric interface. Login time is
composed of two factors – the number of attempts required to successfully login and
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attempt time. Although a reduction in either of these factors should result in a decrease
in login time, a decrease in attempt count would have the greatest affect.

7.1.3 Shoulder-surfing Prevention and Intersection Analysis Hindrance

The primary goal of the ColorDots graphical password scheme was to prevent shouldersurfing attacks. The graphical interface design incorporated components – from the
works of De Luca, Sobrado, and Wiedenbeck – that successfully deterred or prevented
shoulder-surfing attacks (De Luca10, Sobrado02, Wiedenbeck06). One of the key
features of the ColorDots graphical interface was the use of indirect input – entering
password characters using the keyboard rather than the mouse, which was shown to
prevent shoulder-surfing at ATMs (De Luca10). According to shoulder-surfing test
surveys of the subjects that successfully determined the graphical password, a single
screenshot of the graphical login process was insufficient to compromise the graphical
password. Furthermore, the surveys showed subjects had to utilize intersection analysis
on a number of screenshots before they could successfully compromise the graphical
password. The surveys, as well as the previous works, showed that the ColorDots
graphical interface was successful in preventing a shoulder-surfing attack involving the
digital recording of a single login session. By extension, the ColorDots graphical
interface was successful in preventing a shoulder-surfing attack involving the direct
observation of a single login session. Finally, the shoulder-surfing test surveys showed
that subjects needed to utilize intersection analysis on an average of seven screenshots
before they could successfully compromise the graphical password, which required an
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average of 1.67 hours. A minimum of five screenshots were needed to compromise the
graphical password during the shoulder-surfing test, which was over twice the number
needed to compromise the graphical PIN used in the study by De Luca, et al.
(De Luca10). As configured for the shoulder-surfing test, the ColorDots graphical
interface successfully resisted intersection analysis involving the digital recordings of
multiple login sessions.

7.2 Conclusion

This study has shown the ColorDots graphical password scheme was easy to learn, easy
to use, prevented shoulder-surfing, and resisted intersection analysis on digital
recordings of multiple login sessions. Although the subjects participating in this study
had limited exposure to the graphical interface, they were able to learn the graphical
password scheme, and produced test results that rivaled those of the alphanumeric
interface. Furthermore, while attempt and login times for the graphical interface (57.95
seconds and 82.67 seconds, respectively) were significantly longer than the
alphanumeric interface (3.65 seconds and 3.80 seconds, respectively), the average
attempt and login times for the 20 best results were 42.60 seconds and 44.49 seconds,
respectively. With experience, ColorDots could be just as convenient to use as
alphanumeric passwords, and could improve password security in public environments.
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7.3 Suggestions for Further Research

The ColorDots graphical password scheme relies on a combination of colors and
alphanumeric characters, which could make it difficult, if not impossible, for users with
colorblindness or poor eyesight to use successfully. Would improvements to the
ColorDots graphical password scheme make it accessible to a larger group of users?
One improvement example would involve introducing shapes to represent each of the
unique colors in the ColorDots interface to make it more accessible to users with color
blindness. Another improvement example would involve temporarily increasing the
font size of the alphanumeric characters used in the ColorDots interface to assist users
with poor eyesight or those without access to their corrective lenses.

Allowing only UNF student volunteers, who were over the age of 18 and enrolled in at
least one course offered by the School of Computing, limited the variety of computer
users who participated in this study. It is important to test the ColorDots graphical
password scheme using a larger variety of computer users. Does research involving a
larger variety of computer users produce results consistent with those presented in this
study? One research example would accept any UNF student volunteer over the age of
18 and enrolled in at least one course offered by the university. Another research
example would accept any UNF student, faculty or staff volunteer over the age of 18. A
final research example would accept any UNF student, faculty or staff volunteer over
the age of 18, as well as members of his or her immediate family, within a larger age
range.
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To reduce the time and effort required for participants to complete the shoulder-surfing
test conducted in this study, a number of modifications were made to the ColorDots
graphical password scheme. Some of the modifications made include displaying the
actual alphanumeric characters entered in the Enter Password field rather than masking
the characters and disabling the feature responsible for randomly updating the
ColorDots interface after each alphanumeric password character was entered. These
modifications were necessary to capture the entire login process in a single screenshot,
but they limited the complexity of the ColorDots graphical password scheme during this
study; therefore, additional research should test the ColorDots graphical password
scheme without these modifications. Does the complexity of the ColorDots graphical
password scheme increase when these modifications are removed? Is a ColorDots
graphical password less likely to be compromised by shoulder-surfing and intersection
analysis when these modifications are removed?

7.4 Example Use of the ColorDots Graphical Interface

Although the ColorDots graphical password scheme was more complex and time
consuming than traditional alphanumeric passwords, it was capable of providing
increased password security in public environments, where shoulder-surfing attacks
were more likely to occur. Positioning ColorDots as a secure alternative to
alphanumeric passwords for users authenticating in public environments has great
potential. For example, a link, which launches the ColorDots interface, could be
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positioned on an alphanumeric password interface such as login screen of an operating
system or website, like those used for social networking, online banking and online
shopping websites. If a user needs to log in while visiting a public location such as a
coffee shop or café, they could choose to use their ColorDots graphical password rather
than their alphanumeric password.
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APPENDIX A
ColorDots Testing Literature and Instructions

The following pages represent the literature and instructions presented to the subjects
who completed the ColorDots research study. The literature provides general
information about each stage of the research study, and the instructions describe the
steps necessary to complete each stage of the research study.

- 50 -

Overview
Welcome to ColorDots - a graphical password authentication mechanism to prevent
shoulder-surfing attacks and resist intersection analysis.
Advances in technology have resulted in an increase in the number of college students
who use laptop computers, the number of public Wi-Fi hotspots available to college
students - on and off campus, and the number of cell phones and other mobile devices
that have built-in, high-resolution cameras. In this environment, a college student
logging into a secure account in a public location such as the Thomas G. Carpenter
library, Starbucks or Panera Bread is more likely to have their alphanumeric password
stolen using shoulder-surfing.
Shoulder-surfing is a technique for acquiring a student's alphanumeric password in
which the attacker observes, and memorizes, or records the victim's finger movements
as they log into a secure computer account such as their UNF myWings, Facebook or
bank accounts. The attacker simply needs to analyze the observed or recorded finger
movements to determine the password entered by the victim, allowing the attacker to
access the victim's account, compromising their security. Consequentially, since
computer users commonly use the same password for multiple accounts, the attacker
may also gain access to these accounts.
ColorDots is an alternative to traditional, alphanumeric passwords, designed to prevent
shoulder-surfing attacks, protecting computer users while accessing their secure
computer accounts while in public.
The purpose of this study is to determine whether ColorDots is a superior alternative to
alphanumeric passwords compared to other popular graphical password mechanisms.
The ColorDots study is comprised of two sessions - today's session and a session one
week from today. During these sessions, you will complete the following tasks:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Enter your demographic data.
Create your alphanumeric and graphical passwords.
Complete the ColorDots training.
Complete the initial tests using alphanumeric and graphical passwords.
Receive material to help prepare you for the shoulder-surfing test.
Complete the recall tests using alphanumeric and graphical passwords.
Select the victim's graphical password images you derived from the shouldersurfing material provided in step 5.

During today's session, you will complete tasks 1 through 5.
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Creating Test Passwords
You have reached the password creation stage of the study. You will create an
alphanumeric password and a graphical password. Please take your time when creating
your passwords because they will be used throughout the study; therefore, you will want
to choose passwords that are easy for you to remember.
Creating Your Alphanumeric Password
Your alphanumeric password MUST BE EXACTLY 5 characters long; otherwise, you
will receive an error. Enter your alphanumeric password in the "Your Text Password"
field and click the "Set Password" button (Figure 1). Once you "set" your alphanumeric
password, you will not be able to change it.

Figure 1
Creating Your Graphical Password
Your graphical password MUST consist of EXACTLY 3 images, and it cannot contain
any duplicate images; otherwise, you will receive an error. To create your graphical
password (Figure 2), select three images from the 25 available images. Each image you
select (i.e., Football, Smiley Face, 8-Ball) will appear in the cells located in the "Your
Password Images" section. Once you have selected three images for your graphical
password, click the "Set Password" button (Figure 2). If you make a mistake or want to
change the images you have selected, clicking the "Clear Password" button will remove
all of the selected images from the "Your Password Images" section. You can change
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your graphical password images at any time; however, you will be unable to change
your graphical password after you click the "Click Here to Continue" button.

Figure 2
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Training
The ColorDots environment (Figure 1) consists of the following items:
 25 cells, in a 5x5 grid, each containing
o A border color
o An image
o 5 letters, each with a unique color
 5 Column Registration Dots (CRD)
 5 Row Registration Dots (RRD)
 A password field and refresh button

Figure 1

Entering Your Password in the ColorDots Interface
Step 1: Locate your password images in the ColorDots interface (Figure 3). For this
example, assume you selected the password images displayed in Figure 2 for your
graphical password (image order is not important).

Figure 2

Figure 3
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Step 2: Visualize a triangle over the ColorDots grid that connects the three password
images (Figure 4). In the next step, ignore the images NOT covered by the triangle
(Figure 5).

Figure 4

Figure 5

Step 3: Visually draw horizontal, vertical and diagonal lines from each password image
into the triangle (Figure 6). Continue until one line from each password image
intersects over a single image, which cannot be one of the original password images
(Figure 7). The cell containing this image is the Initial Intersection Cell (C0) (Figure 8).

Figure 6

Figure 7
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Figure 8

Step 4: Select the Row Registration Dot (RRD) that has the same color as the border of
C0 (Figure 9). Then, select the Column Registration Dot (CRD) that has the same color
as the RRD of C0 (Figure 10). Locate the cell that exists at the intersection of the
selected RRD and CRD – this is the First Password Cell (C1) (Figure 11). Finally,
select the letter from C1 that has the same color as the CRD of C0, and enter this letter in
the password field (Figure 12).

Figure 9

Figure 10

Figure 11

Figure 12

Step 5: Repeat step 4 to locate the Second Password Cell (C2), select the appropriate
letter from C2, and enter the letter in the password field (Figure 13).

Figure 13

Figure 14
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Step 6: Repeat step 4 to locate the Third Password Cell (C3), select the appropriate
letter from C3, and enter the letter in the password field (Figure 14).
Step 7: Repeat step 4 to locate the Fourth Password Cell (C4), select the appropriate
letter from C4, and enter the letter in the password field (Figure 15).
Step 8: Repeat step 4 to locate the Fifth Password Cell (C5), select the appropriate letter
from C5, and enter the letter in the password field (Figure 16).

Figure 15

Figure 16

After you enter the fifth letter in the password field, validation of the entered password
occurs automatically.
You will have access to these instructions throughout the training stage of this study to
review. You should become comfortable with the ColorDots login process before
continuing on to the training stage. If you have any questions, please contact the
primary investigator.
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Initial Test Phase
You are now prepared to take the four login tests, which will determine your
performance when using alphanumeric and graphical passwords.
Alphanumeric Password Tests
The first two tests involve alphanumeric passwords. The first test requires you to log in
using a randomly generated alphanumeric password. The system will prompt you with
the random alphanumeric password to use prior to commencing the test (Figure 1).

Figure 1

When prompted for the random alphanumeric password (Figure 2), enter the password,
and click the Submit button. Once the test is completed, you will continue on to the
next test.

Figure 2

The second test requires you to log in using the alphanumeric password you created
earlier. The system will prompt you with the alphanumeric password you created prior
to commencing the test (Figure 3).

Figure 3

When prompted for your alphanumeric password (Figure 4), enter the password, and
click the Submit button. Once the test is completed, you will continue on to the
graphical password tests.
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Figure 4

Graphical Password Tests
The last two tests involve graphical passwords. The third test requires you to log in
using a randomly generated graphical password. The system will prompt you with the
random graphical password to use prior to commencing the test (Figure 5).

Figure 5

When prompted with the ColorDots interface, enter the password using the ColorDots
process. Once the test is completed, you will continue on to the last test.
The fourth test requires you to log in using the graphical password you created earlier.
The system will prompt you with the graphical password you created prior to
commencing the test (Figure 6).

Figure 6

When prompted with the ColorDots interface, enter the password using the ColorDots
process. Once the test is completed, you will continue on to the next stage of the study.
Important Notes
 Each test will commence the moment you click the OK button on the password
prompts (Figures 1, 3, 5, and 6); therefore, take as much time as necessary to
commit each password to memory, but do not write the password down or make
any notes to assist you as this may skew the test results.
 You have three attempts to enter a password correctly. After the third attempt,
you will automatically continue on to the next test.
If you have any questions, contact the primary investigator - the individual responsible
for this research study - now or prior to starting a test.
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Recall Test Phase
You are about to take 2 final login tests, which will determine your ability to recall your
alphanumeric and graphical passwords, as well as your ability to recall how to log in
using the ColorDots process.
Alphanumeric Password Recall Test
During this test, you will log in using the alphanumeric password you created during the
first session of the ColorDots study. The system will prompt you prior to commencing
the test (Figure 1).

Figure 1

When prompted for your alphanumeric password (Figure 2), enter the password, and
click the Submit button. Once the test is completed, you will continue on to the next
test.

Figure 2

Graphical Password Recall Test
During the final test, you will log in using the graphical password you created during
the first session of the ColorDots study. The system will prompt you prior to
commencing the test (Figure 3).

Figure 3

When prompted with the ColorDots interface, enter the password using the ColorDots
process. Once the test is completed, you will continue on to the next stage of the study.
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Important Notes




Each test will commence the moment you click the OK button on the recall test
prompts (Figures 1 and 3); therefore, do not click the OK button until you are
prepared to take the test.
You have three attempts to enter your alphanumeric password correctly. After
the third attempt, you will automatically continue on to the graphical password
recall test.
You have three attempts to enter your graphical password correctly. After the
third attempt, you will have an opportunity to practice using the ColorDots
process. Once you complete the ColorDots refresher, you will have three
additional attempts to enter your graphical password correctly. After the third
attempt, you will automatically continue on to the next stage of the study.

If you have any questions, contact the primary investigator - the individual responsible
for this research study - now or prior to starting a test.
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Shoulder-surfing Test Phase
You have reached the final stage of this study. You will select the three graphical
password images you identified from the 10 screenshots provided after completing
session 1, last week. If necessary, you may review the shoulder-surfing material now
by clicking on the following link: (link to shoulder-surfing review material).
Please take as much time as necessary to examine the provided material adequately and
attempt to discover the three graphical password images used. To maintain the
legitimacy of the shoulder-surfing test, you are asked to keep to yourself any notes used
while reviewing the shoulder-surfing material and not to discuss your image choices
with other participants.
Graphical Password Images Selection
You MUST select EXACTLY 3 images, and you
cannot choose duplicate images. To enter your
selected images (Figure 1), select three images from
the 25 available images. Each image you select (i.e.,
Football, Smiley Face, 8-Ball) will appear in the cells
located in the "Your Password Images" section. Once
you select your three graphical password images, click
the "Set Password" button (Figure 1). If you make a
mistake or want to change the images you selected,
clicking the "Clear Password" button will remove all
of the selected images from the "Your Password
Images" section. You can only enter your selected
password images once; therefore, please verify the
password images you selected before clicking the "Set
Password" button.

Figure 1

Clicking the "Set Password" button records your selected password images. To
maintain the legitimacy of the shoulder-surfing test, neither the primary investigator nor
his adviser can confirm or deny the validity of your selected password images. After
the study is completed, the primary investigator will reveal the correct graphical
password images, as well as the participants who guessed correctly, in an email
message to each participant.
If you have any questions about selecting your password images, contact the primary
investigator.
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How to Perform Intersection Analysis
This material will help you prepare for the shoulder-surfing test during session 2.
Please refer to the 10 screenshots below. Each screen shot shows the letters used to log
into a computer system using the ColorDots system. Use your knowledge of the
ColorDots login process to analyze the information available in each screenshot, and
attempt to deduce the three password images used for the password. The ColorDots
instructions are available for you to review.
The following steps provide one possible method to identify the user's password images
using intersection analysis:
1. Using the letters in the Enter Password field, work the process backwards to
discover the original intersection (C0).
2. Create a list of all the images that can have a line drawn to C0.
3. Create a list of all the possible 3-image combinations from these images.
4. Repeat steps 1 - 3 using two or more screenshots.
5. Compare each list of image combinations created in step 3 for each screenshot,
and remove any combinations that do not appear for each screenshot.
6. Continue to reduce the number of image combinations (repeat steps 1 - 5 for
each additional screenshot, if necessary) until you are left with 3 to 5 image
combinations. One of these combinations is the graphical password.
Please note that it may be possible to perform this process until only one image
combination exists.
Bring your final list of image combinations to session 2.
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APPENDIX B
ColorDots Surveys

The following pages represent the surveys provided to the subjects whom completed the
ColorDots research study. The surveys allow the subjects to provide information about
their experience with ColorDots during the study, as well as their opinions about the
ColorDots graphical password scheme.
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ColorDots Research Study Survey
Thank you for participating in the ColorDots research study over the past two weeks.
We would appreciate it if you would provide us with some feedback related to your
experiences with the ColorDots graphical password tool. For the first eight statements,
use the following scale:
1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree
0. ColorDots is easy to use.
1

2

3

4

5

1. Alphanumeric passwords are vulnerable to shoulder-surfing attack.
1

2

3

4

5

2. ColorDots graphical passwords are more secure than alphanumeric passwords.
1

2

3

4

5

4

5

3. I would use ColorDots as my primary login interface.
1

2

3

4. I would use ColorDots rather than an alphanumeric password to login in public.
1

2

3

4

5

5. The time required to log in using a ColorDots graphical password is acceptable.
1

2

3

4

5

6. ColorDots graphical passwords are vulnerable to shoulder-surfing attack.
1

2

3

4

5

7. The time required to log in using a ColorDots graphical password will improve
as I become more comfortable and experienced with ColorDots.
1

2

3

4

5

8. Please provide any additional comments or feedback you may have regarding
the ColorDots graphical password scheme and your experiences during this
research study (use the back of this sheet, if necessary).
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ColorDots Shoulder-surfing Survey
Congratulations! You correctly selected my password images during the shouldersurfing stage of the ColorDots research study. I would appreciate it if you would
answer the following questions concerning your experiences while deducing the correct
password images.
0. How many screenshots were required to identify the password images?

1. How much time (in hours) was required to identify the password images?

2. Did you use a “brute force” methodology or did you follow a logical system
such as the one provided with the shoulder-surfing material?

3. Did you identify any patterns that assisted in deducing the password images?

4. In your opinion, are there any aspects of the ColorDots graphical password
scheme that make it vulnerable to shoulder-surfing attack?

5. In your opinion, are there any aspects of the ColorDots graphical password
scheme that, if changed, could make ColorDots more secure?

6. Please provide any additional comments or feedback you may have regarding
the ColorDots graphical password scheme that could make ColorDots more
secure and/or less vulnerable to shoulder-surfing attack (use the back of this
sheet, if necessary).

- 66 -

APPENDIX C
ColotDots Challenge-Response Authentication Example

The following represents an example challenge-response authentication process for the
ColorDots graphical password scheme. The example lists the messages passed between
the client and server, the order of communication and the values contained in each
message. Although the ColorDots implementation used for testing did not fully
implement this example, the implementation included most of the concepts.
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Stage
0
1
2
3
4
5

Stage Name
Announcement
Acknowledgement
Request
Response
Submission
Validation

Term
Session
EventID
Client
Port
Username
Seed
Password
Result
Stage
0
1
2
3
4
5

Source
Client
Server
Client
Server
Client
Server

Destination
Server
Client
Server
Client
Server
Client

Values Passed
Session, EventID, Client
Session, EventID, Port
Session, EventID, Client, Username
Session, EventID, Seed
Session, EventID, Password
Session, EventID, Result

Definition
Random, unique value representing the current login session
An integer value starting at 0, and incremented with each stage
Unique value representing the client to prevent unauthorized access
Server selected value used for each stage after Acknowledgement
Uniquely identifies the user during the login attempt (encrypted value)
Random value that “seeds” the client and server (encrypted value)
String of characters entered during the login attempt (encrypted value)
Represents the pass/fail condition of the login attempt (encrypted value)

Procedure
Note: For each stage, the Session and EventID values are validated
Client transmits the Announcement message with required values
Server validates Client, selects a port, transmits Acknowledgement message
Client reconnects to the server on new port, transmits Request message with encrypted
Username value
Server validates Client and Username, selects Seed value, calculates encrypted
password, transmits Response message with encrypted Seed value
Client displays interface using Seed value, accepts submitted password, transmits
Submission message with encrypted Password value
Server compares encrypted password value, transmits Validation message
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